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Alan B. Krueger, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, 
Norbert Schwarz, and Arthur A. Stone
The contributors to this volume raise several valid points about the strengths 
and weaknesses of our proposed method for National Time Accounting 
(NTA), particularly regarding the idea of measuring subjective well-  being 
by the fraction of time people spend in an unpleasant emotional state (the 
U- index; see chapter 1 of this volume). To be clear, we should emphasize that 
in our contribution, we did not attempt to provide a comprehensive measure 
of all aspects of well-  being. We oﬀer a new measure of an aspect of well-
  being that is: (a) relevant to people’s daily lives, (b) distinct and measured 
separately from other aspects of well- being in the existing literature, and (c) 
related to possible policy actions (e.g., overtime restrictions) and technologi-
cal developments in society because of the link to time use.
In this brief rejoinder we concentrate on responding to the main criticisms 
raised. But we should not lose sight of the generally positive and encour-
aging reactions to the approach that we proposed, especially by J. Steven 
Landefeld, whose agency is charged with measuring the National Income 
and Product Accounts (see chapter 4 of this volume). Our goal here is to 
highlight what can be done to improve the measurement of evaluated time 
use and to clarify what our approach adds and does not add, rather than to 
defend our approach as the only way to proceed.
In chapter 2 of this volume, George Loewenstein states, “I believe that 
much if not most of what makes life worthwhile is not captured by moment 
to moment happiness, but corresponds more closely, if not perfectly, to what 
Krueger et al. acknowledge to be absent from NTA, namely ‘people’s general 
sense of satisfaction or fulﬁ  llment with their lives as a whole, apart from 
moment to moment feelings.’” This theme also emerges to a lesser extent 
in David Cutler’s chapter (see chapter 3 of this volume). We already have 
acknowledged that our approach to NTA excludes one’s sense of meaning 244        A. B. Krueger, D. Kahneman, D. Schkade, N. Schwarz, and A. A. Stone
and fulﬁ  llment, although we suspect that a high sense of fulﬁ  llment will not 
be without positive emotional consequences. Still, we think that NTA, and 
the U-  index in particular, capture a good deal of what makes life miserable, 
if not what makes it worthwhile. First, people who are in pain or depressed 
much of the time are probably miserable; they certainly spend their time in 
more restricted ways than others who are not in pain or depressed, and they 
express low levels of life satisfaction. Second, the approach can be extended 
to measure additional features of experience related to whether time use is 
worthwhile, such as whether people consider their speciﬁ  c uses of time to 
be a waste of time or meaningful. Third, one could perform a horse race to 
examine whether cumulative aﬀective experience or self-  reported life sat-
isfaction does a better job predicting objective outcomes, such as health 
and mortality. We hope this test will be conducted in the future. Fourth, we 
think the U- index has measurement properties that are superior to standard 
measures of life satisfaction, such as being an ordinal measure at the level of 
feelings experienced in situ. Moreover, standard measures of global life sat-
isfaction are subject to numerous contextual inﬂ  uences (Schwarz and Strack 
1999), which are attenuated under episodic reporting conditions (Schwarz, 
Kahneman, and Xu 2009). Lastly, we note that even if global evaluations 
of life satisfaction and fulﬁ  llment are considered to provide a more accurate 
reﬂ  ection of the extent to which life is worthwhile, experienced well-  being 
measures still provide additional information about the emotional experi-
ence of daily life.
David G. Blanchﬂ  ower raises the question of whether experienced well-
 being and the U- index yield many new insights beyond what has been learned 
from studies of life satisfaction and overall happiness (see chapter 7 of this 
volume). He emphasizes that results using data on either self-  reported hap-
piness or the U-  index ﬁ  nd that subjective well-  being is higher for those who 
are older, white, married, and employed, and for those who are more highly 
educated and have higher income. We view ﬁ  ndings such as these as partly 
validating our measure of experienced well- being. At the same time, the cor-
relation between experienced well-  being and a circumstance like household 
income is substantially weaker than the correlation between life satisfac-
tion and income, suggesting that a diﬀerent process relates circumstances to 
people’s experienced happiness than to their global judgments of well- being. 
Indeed, the Easterlin paradox of a weak correlation between income (or 
changes in income) and subjective well- being (or changes in subjective well-
 being) seems to apply more strongly when subjective well- being is measured 
by experienced aﬀect than by a judgment of life as a whole (see Stevenson 
and Wolfers 2008; Kahneman et al. 2006; Krueger 2008).
If the only goal of NTA was to describe people or demographic groups, 
then we would agree with Blanchﬂ  ower that it is possible to collect subjec-
tive well-  being data more eﬃciently than with evaluated time use. However, 
characterizing people is not the only goal, or even the main goal, of NTA. Rejoinder    2 4 5
An important application is to understand from where diﬀerences in well-
  being arise. National Time Accounting provides insight into this issue by 
illuminating how diﬀerent sociodemographic positions are associated with 
diﬀerent time use and diﬀerent emotional experiences, providing informa-
tion that is policy relevant. Moreover, cross-  national comparisons on the 
basis of NTA data provide insight into how diﬀerent organizations of daily 
life relate to the well-  being of citizens by permitting a decomposition of 
diﬀerences in subjective well-  being between countries into diﬀerences due 
to time allocation and diﬀerences due to the emotional experience of a given 
set of activities. For international comparisons, Blanchﬂ  ower acknowl-
edges that one obtains meaningfully diﬀerent results using aﬀect reported 
for episodes of the previous day—or even the previous week—and reports 
of overall happiness and life satisfaction. The reversal of the ranking of 
the French and American comparison in our chapter is a vivid example of 
this phenomenon, and Blanchﬂ  ower provides additional data to this eﬀect. 
Likewise, changes for a nation over time can be traced to changes in time 
use and changes in emotional experiences for a given time allocation. These 
decompositions are not possible with standard satisfaction data. Part of 
what makes life more enjoyable is spending more time in enjoyable activities; 
this is highlighted in NTA. We also note that none of the previous studies 
in the time-  use literature that touched on NTA actually applied the tech-
nique to compare diﬀerences between countries or changes within countries 
over time.
Another goal of NTA is to characterize the emotional experience of time 
use during certain activities and situations. Our and others’ (e.g., Csikszent-
mihalyi 1990; Robinson and Godbey 1997) measures of experienced well-
  being have added new insights in this regard. For example, we ﬁ  nd that 
child care and adult care appear to be particularly unpleasant activities 
while they are being conducted. We also ﬁ  nd that commuting ranks as one 
of the most unpleasant activities of the day, while watching television is an 
aﬀectively average activity. And we ﬁ  nd that interacting with others gener-
ally raises the emotional experience of an activity. Findings like these extend 
the boundaries of what has been learned from global judgments of life as 
a whole.
William Nordhaus maintains that there is a fundamental ﬂ  aw in attempts 
to use subjective well-  being as a social indicator (see chapter 5 of this vol-
ume). He argues that emotions, and subjective well- being more generally, are 
not—and cannot be—interpersonally cardinal variables. Nordhaus argues 
that an interpersonally cardinal variable “must have a uniquely deﬁ  ned zero 
and a well-  deﬁ  ned unit of increment, and there must be a method to com-
pare the values across individuals.” He further argues that the zero point 
(and presumably the increment) must be stable across time and people. He 
claims that there simply is no interpersonal scale for reporting subjective 
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argues, “constitute a meaningful index of emotions because they are not 
based on interpersonally cardinal variables.”
Before responding, it is useful to be clear about terms. Subjective data are 
reports of variables that only the person doing the reporting can observe. 
Objective data can, in principle, be observed by an external party (or parties) 
in addition to the person doing the reporting. Feelings are clearly subjective. 
No one else can experience your emotions to verify how you feel, although 
others can see likely correlates of your emotions (e.g., whether you smile or 
grimace). Life satisfaction is also an inherently subjective variable. Height, 
consumption, and income are objective variables. What makes objective 
data, like height or consumptions, interpersonally cardinal variables is not 
that they can be observed by a third party, however, but that a common 
convention is used to measure and report them. For example, height can be 
measured in inches or centimeters for someone in shoes or bare feet. Without 
the convention of a ruler, height does not meet Nordhaus’s interpersonally 
cardinal criteria. Even for objective variables, there are situations in which 
there is not an accepted convention of measurement. For example, prior to 
the advent of railroads and time zones in the nineteenth century, every local 
town set its own time; zero hour was diﬀerent in diﬀerent locales. Greenwich 
Mean Time enabled time to be measurable.
At one level, we have some sympathy for Nordhaus’ critique—indeed, the 
U- index was developed largely to relax some of the restrictive measurement 
requirements of social indicators. The U- index does not require a unique and 
universally deﬁ  ned zero point and increment to be a useful social indicator. It 
was developed precisely to avoid the need for interpersonal comparisons of 
interval scaled data, which is the thrust of Nordhaus’ critique. Yet at another 
level we disagree with his critique, even as it applies to more standard mea-
sures of subjective well-  being that preceded the U-  index.
Nordhaus asserts that subjective variables such as pleasure or pain and 
likes or dislikes are not interpersonally comparable. He asserts this on prin-
ciple and provides no theoretical or empirical justiﬁ  cation for his conten-
tion. Yet the extensive material reviewed in sections 1.3.1 to 1.3.3 of our 
chapter provides substantial evidence that measures of subjective experience 
are meaningfully related to physiological indicators and are predictive of 
important real-  world outcomes, from marriage to immune system function 
to mortality. This evidence is diﬃcult to reconcile if diﬀerences in subjective 
reports of well-  being across subjects are meaningless because they are not 
interpersonally comparable. There are numerous examples where conven-
tions of measurement have been successfully used to report and compare 
ratings of emotions and subjective evaluations across individuals. Consider 
the following scenarios. College students are routinely asked to rate the qual-
ity of their professors on a numerical scale, and the average rating across 
students is used for tenure and salary decisions. Netﬂ  ix asks subscribers 
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this information, along with other subscribers’ subjective ratings, to pro-
vide recommendations for new movies. Companies routinely survey their 
employees’ and customers’ satisfaction. Doctors in every hospital in the 
United States ask patients how much pain they feel on a scale of zero to 
ten, sometimes associating faces with the diﬀerent ratings, and the responses 
are used to guide a course of action. Even the Journal of Political Economy 
asks referees to give a subjective rating of the quality of the paper they 
reviewed, from one to one hundred. Unless one believes that all of these 
eﬀorts are pure folly, providing no useful information, it would seem that 
subjective variables pass a market test of being interpersonally cardinal. In 
sum, making interpersonal comparisons of individuals’ subjective ratings 
has proved a valuable and enduring practice in numerous ﬁ  elds, and the 
mere fact that the cardinality criteria that Nordhaus lays out are hard to 
substantiate does not imply that the measures fail to capture meaningful 
information.
At a conceptual level, thousands of years of evolution have probably 
abetted the development of conventions to enable people to communicate 
and convey the intensity of their emotions. It is in one’s survival interest to 
be able to detect and express how much something hurts, for example. The 
socialization process also guides people to express the strength of their emo-
tions in an understandable way. Verbal descriptions of feelings come to have 
somewhat common meanings, although there can be a lot of noise in the way 
people express themselves. Nonetheless, this process enables interpersonal 
measurement conventions to be established for subjective variables. It is 
also worth noting that in surveys, it is common to give respondents verbal 
anchors to guide them (e.g., a zero means the feeling was not present, and a 
six means it was very much part of the experience) so they have a common 
zero point and a sense of what the interval between scales is in reporting 
subjective responses.1 Although we would not push this argument too far, 
there are reasons to believe that social conventions can make it possible to 
report and contrast emotions.
We recognize, however, that language and custom can aﬀect the conven-
tion that is used to report subjective variables. Diﬀerent societies develop 
diﬀerent conventions. Indeed, we argue in chapter 1 that this is an issue for 
comparisons of life satisfaction between France and the United States. This 
is one reason why we proposed the U-  index. The U-  index is robust to the 
interpersonal measurement convention, as long as a given person uses the 
same convention for positive and negative emotions.
As Nordhaus acknowledges, the U-  index “would appear to avoid the 
diﬃculties of some happiness indices by its creation of an ordinal index.” 
1. It seems to us that the absence of feeling an emotion like pain does provide a natural zero 
point, even if the width of the interval of increments may be vague. Thus, we think it should 
be noncontroversial to develop an index that measures the percentage of time that people 
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However, he argues that our procedure “simply pushes the diﬃculty into the 
background.” To us, the appeal of the U-  index is that diﬀerent people do 
not have to use the same convention to measure their emotions, as long as 
the emotion that they rate highest is the one that they feel most intensively 
at the time. Stated simply, the requirement for the U- index is for someone to 
be able to decide at a given moment if they are feeling more happy than sad 
A measurement parable
One of the anonymous reviewers of this volume suggested the follow-
ing response to William Nordhaus’s claim that “hedonic measures do 
not meet the standards for an interpersonally cardinal variable that 
are required to construct a meaningful quantitative social indicator.”
Imagine a world where lots of people smoke. However, this world has 
not progressed enough scientiﬁ  cally to have anything like twenty-
 ﬁ rst century measures of health. All that this world has achieved, 
sad to say, is some rough subjective measures of health. There are 
in this world some surveys that look at just those. In them, human 
beings ﬁ  ll out forms where they report how they feel in response to 
questions such as “My health is excellent . . . fairly good . . . poor 
. . . very poor?” and they give other social and economic data. But 
there are no blood test readings or heartbeat count or scans or any-
thing like that. . . . But they can, in this world, run regression equa-
tions. Their dictator must have been a theoretical econometrician.
A commentator of the day, called BN, makes a big speech and 
says there is no point in trying to use these subjective health mea-
sures for anything. You should all pack up and go home, he says.
But, to show he is wrong, a group of researchers tries to estimate 
Subjective Health equations and they ﬁ  nd that smoking comes in 
with a big negative coeﬃcient, whether controlling for everything 
else or not controlling (it does, incidentally, if you estimate Sub-
jective Health equations on twenty-  ﬁ  rst century data). They then 
prescribe anti-  smoking restrictions. BN writes complaining letters, 
lamenting the end of the scientiﬁ  c measurable method, to the New 
York Times, but the researchers press ahead. Millions of lives are 
saved. They become heroes. Yet according to BN not a single inter-
personally cardinal health indicator exists in this world.
The referee’s parable, which is not so far removed from reality, high-
lights the point that progress has been made by comparing individu-
als’ subjective evaluations of their health and other domains of life.
∗In his original draft, Nordhaus used the phrase “measurable variable” instead of 
“interpersonally cardinal variable.” We have edited the referee’s passage to accord with 
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or more pain than pleasure. Nordhaus argues that the intensity of emotions 
cannot be compared because there is no conceivable zero point or increment 
for emotions, even for a given person at a given moment in time.
Nordhaus accepts that emotions can satisfy an ordinal ranking, presum-
ably meaning that someone can determine that he or she feels more or less 
pain in a given situation. He does not believe that it is possible for someone to 
decide whether he or she feels more pain than pleasure during that situation, 
however. Thus, the runner who reports in our surveys that while jogging, 
his pain is high but his happiness is even higher is not providing meaningful 
information, according to Nordhaus; nor is the runner who says he felt more 
pain than pleasure when he sprained his ankle. It is not clear, however, why 
ordinality would apply within emotions but not between them. Emotions 
have some properties in common. If the human brain is capable of deciding 
that something hurts more or less in a given situation, why can it not decide 
that a given situation is more painful than pleasurable?
No evidence is presented to substantiate Nordhaus’ claim that the strength 
of emotions at a point in time cannot be compared, or that in principle, there 
is unlikely to be a natural zero point for pain and other emotions. Indeed, 
Nordhaus implies that no evidence (such as the correlation between self-
  reported emotions and brain imaging) could persuade him that emotions 
can be compared, because they are not measurable variables. His argument 
rests on the presumption that the (conceptual) zero point and increment for 
measuring emotions “will vary with mood, circumstances, genetics, context, 
history, and culture.” This is a more diﬃcult argument to defend when it 
comes to the U-  index, however, as the U-  index tries to measure mood as an 
outcome, and the zero point and increment can be person speciﬁ  c for the 
U-  index—so genetics, history, and culture are not stumbling blocks. While 
the factors that Nordhaus raises may well add noise to the measurement 
of the U-  index, they do not seem to make it meaningless for individuals to 
rate the intensity of how they feel at a point in time along various aﬀective 
dimensions.
To the extent that one considers evidence relevant, the evidence does sug-
gest to us that there is much useful signal in the U-  index, and evaluated 
time use more generally. As detailed in our chapter, reports of the intensity 
of emotions across individuals do correlate with physiological measures. 
If self-  rated emotions were not comparable across people, at least to some 
extent, we would expect a correlation of zero. In addition, the pattern of 
the U-  index across demographic groups and activities is, for the most part, 
intuitive. Finally, cognitive interviews indicated that subjects selected the 
aﬀective dimension that they assigned the highest numerical rating to as the 
most intense feeling they had during the episode.
Nordhaus misrepresents the U-  index when he writes, “This approach is 
equivalent to assuming that there are interpersonally cardinal subindices 
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function does not need to be interpersonally cardinal—it can vary across 
individuals. Moreover, U(P, H) can vary for a given individual over time, 
and it is unnecessary for the researcher to specify the U(P, H) function for 
the U-  index to be a meaningful social indicator. The experience of a given 
person feeling more pain than pleasure is of relevance even if the underlying 
preference function changes.
Nordhaus goes beyond the requirements for interpersonal cardinality in 
criticizing the U-  index, because the U-  index is an ordinal measure at the 
level of emotions. He argues that “blue moods” or unpleasant experiences 
cannot conceivably be deﬁ  ned or measured because there is no natural zero 
point or standard increment for a given person’s emotions.2 In this view, 
no latent variable can conceivably indicate a person’s likes and dislikes or 
pleasure and pain. However, this standard would seem inconsistent with the 
underpinnings of the “standard ordinal preference function” as well. If a 
person can decide that one bundle is preferred to another, then Nordhaus 
would presumably accept that there is an underlying latent variable with a 
common zero point and well- deﬁ  ned increment that enables the two bundles 
to be compared. Thus, the extent to which someone liked something would 
have to be a conceivable latent variable for that person to decide that he 
or she preferred one bundle over another and therefore chose it (presum-
ing that people choose the bundle they like most). The only diﬀerence in 
measurement requirements between the U-  index and the standard ordinal 
preference function is that in the former, a person is assumed capable of 
comparing whether he or she is more happy than sad at a given time, and 
in the latter, the person is assumed capable of comparing how much he or 
she would like alternative consumption bundles that he or she may or may 
not consume.
All social indicators require assumptions and entail some noise and 
uncertainty. The assumptions underlying our proposal for National Time 
Accounting seem to us to strike a reasonable balance between measure-
ment requirements and practicality. We did not develop the U-  index from 
ﬁ  rst principles as a comprehensive indicator of the well-  being of soci-
ety. Instead, we oﬀer it as a plausible indicator of the relative frequency 
of misery experienced in certain settings and by various groups. We hope 
that the U-  index and related indicators can provide a useful indicator of 
situations that are associated with unpleasant emotional experiences and 
of groups that are more likely to endure emotionally unpleasant experi-
ences. We would not expect a goal of public policy to be to minimize the 
U- index, but instead for the U- index to highlight areas that are worth further 
investigation. We also hope that NTA can provide a means for tracking 
2. Presumably, to deﬁ  ne a blue mood, all one would need is a zero point—the absence of 
feeling blue—because the width of the increment is irrelevant if the goal is to derive an indica-
tor of the presence or absence of any nonzero level of the emotion.Rejoinder    2 5 1
whether societies are spending their time in more or less enjoyable ways, 
which can be an input along with others to derive a picture of the progress 
of society.
In conclusion, it is useful to recall Jan Tinbergen’s (1976) advice: “Progress 
in our understanding can only be based on the push for measurement of 
phenomena previously thought to be non-  measurable” (51).
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